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Culturalism of Exclusion in an Established- 
Outsider-Figuration 
Inken Rommel ∗ 
Abstract: »Kulturalisierung von Exklusion in einer Etablierten-Außenseiter-Fi-
guration«. This paper paradigmatically deals with the problem of understanding 
and explanation of established-outsider-figurations which have been mostly 
grasped in the dominant research, public understanding as well as political de-
bates under the category ‘cultural differences.’ Further, I am going to evaluate 
the concept of an established-outsider figuration of Norbert Elias as much 
more adequate to understand group conflicts and their dynamics in time. In 
this paper, using the example of the “Sarrazin debate,” I would like to work out 
how the differences in power ratios could be perceived in an established-
outsider-relationship as differences of human beings in terms of their quality 
as well as their values as groups and as individuals. This connection is concep-
tualised by Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson as “the logic of the emotions.” 
Keywords: Norbert Elias, established-outsider-figuration, process sociology, 
Samual P. Huntington, clash of civilizations, Thilo Sarrazin. 
1.  A New Dividing Paradigm 
After the political and social examination of the horrible crime of the Holocaust 
within the National Socialist dictatorship and the clarification about the danger 
of racist ideologies in the public sector of educational entities, one could have 
thought that overt defamation of minorities must not longer be possible in 
Germany. The racist riots of the 1980s and 1990s seemed to be overcome. 
Nevertheless, it looks like a new dividing paradigm has established itself dur-
ing the last decades. ‘Culture’ as a concept appears nowadays as the dominant 
frame of reference to explain social inequalities as well as crisis and conflicts 
between groups worldwide. ‘Culture’ is actually very fluid and constantly 
changing, and from this perspective is experienced as something solid and 
accordingly as something which fully determines individuals to their cultural 
group. I will argue in this paper that discriminations based on race or ‘culture’ 
may differ in their form and appearance, but not in their structure – a group of 
people gets stigmatised because of attributed categories and associated negative 
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features, the members of the group get homogenised and regarded as inferior. 
Especially a mismatch or antagonism between Western and Muslim ‘culture’ 
seems to be self-evident to a group of Germans, which has been shown in Sar-
razin debate. Attitudes like ‘Islam does not belong in Germany’ or ‘Islam mis-
matches with Western democratic merits,’ which appear a lot in the German 
discourse about Muslims, illustrate that. The rise of the party Alternative für 
Deutschland (AFD) and Pegida as a movement are among other things related 
to this kind of perception. 
The concept of Muslim as the enemy is becoming more targeted, with Islam be-
ing held accountable for many social Problems, like unemployment, the sup-
posed inundation of foreigners and deficits in education. A religion has become 
a scapegoat – and a focal point for intolerance and hate (Follath 2010, 3). 
The analysis of interdependencies and figurations of human beings and groups 
with the aid of reality-congruent concepts are fundamental to understanding 
social life. Elias delivers such concepts in his theoretical framework. As Elias 
and Scotson evaluated in their study in Winston Parva on established and out-
siders (Elias and Scotson 1994) the kind of stigmatising group disgrace which 
is attributed to the Muslims in Germany is not based on authentic characteris-
tics of Muslim people as a group but on asymmetrical power-balances between 
Muslims and the majority society. Further in this article, I am going to point 
out significant aspects to power-relations and the perception of these power-
relations within the “logic of emotions” (ibid., xxiii) established by Elias and 
Scotson, which have structured and are structuring the relationship between 
both groups as established and outsiders. In an established-outsider figuration 
there are always differences in the distribution of power and status resources. I 
am going to use this concept to explain the conflicts and discriminations be-
tween Autochthons and Muslim as established and outsider in Germany.  
1.1  Sarrazin’s View on Muslims 
In Germany, the debate around Thilo Sarrazin, who published his book Ger-
many Does Away with Itself in 2010, can be seen as a paradigmatic example for 
the antithetic discourse about the West and Islam in European countries. Sar-
razin’s book, which blames German Muslims to be the reason why “Germany 
Does Away with Itself,” including denigrator descriptions about the Muslim 
population in Germany became a bestseller and has been the main topic in 
public debates for months.1 Here is how Sarrazin describes Muslims: 
No other religion in Europe makes so many demands. No immigrant group ra-
ther than Muslims is so strongly connected with claims on the welfare state 
                                                             
1  Until 2012 Sarrazin had already sold 1.5 million hardcover prints of his book. It is already in its 
10th edition <http://www.gfk-entertainment.com/news/thilo-sarrazin-sprengt-alle-rekorde. 
html>. 
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and crime. No group emphasizes their differences so strongly in public, espe-
cially through women’s clothing. In no other religion is the transition to vio-
lence dictatorship and terrorism so fluid (Sarrazin 2010b). 
Sarrazin points out the Muslim religion and culture as not matching German or 
Western merits. In result from that, as Sarrazin admits, the Muslim population 
in Germany is overrepresented in the underclass and under-represented in high-
er positions of society. Because of a high fertility that he assumes to Muslims, 
he predicts a foreign infiltration of Germany by this group within few genera-
tions (Sarrazin 2010a, 259). Sarrazin establishes a threatening front of Muslims 
in Germany which would be constantly growing. He blames Muslims for being 
underrepresented in employment market and overrepresented in the social care 
system, also as substandard in educational level and surpassing in crime. He 
suggests Muslims that Muslims aim to construct parallel societies to isolate 
themselves from the mainstream society and are not willing to learn the Ger-
man language. In addition, Sarrazin argues that their orientation on religion and 
tradition makes them likely to join terrorist organisations (ibid., 265 et seq.). 
Even though a lot of Muslim immigrants have been in Germany for more than 
thirty years, already in their third and fourth generations being a regular part of 
German society, Sarrazin alienates Muslims and contrasts them with the au-
tochthonous part of the society. 
Interesting in this context is that not only the Neo-Nazi scene and right-wing 
parties in Germany seemed to agree with Sarrazin, a social democrat himself, 
but also a great range of people who actually see themselves as liberal and 
democratic and especially well-educated, such as editors of newspapers, politi-
cians of established parties, writers and so on.2 This shows that the paradigm of 
“culture” as something distinctive and somehow essentialist is widespread in 
German society. Also this fact opposes the popular conviction that racist and 
exclusive attitudes are only questions of the educational level of people. As 
racist I interpret attitudes which rely on the perception that genetic dispositions 
of one group make them more or less worth as human beings compared to 
others (Miles 1991, 9). Following Norbert Elias, it is more important what kind 
of education is received and what kind of self-image is transported in the na-
tional education system, in historical narratives, literature, and myths. Since 
Western societies have been in a hegemonic position in world affairs since 
more than 300 years, their philosophy, self-image, and history writing allege to 
that hegemonic position as developed and civilised promoting the view other 
societies are less developed and less civilised. This contains the claim that 
other societies are supposed to learn from the “West” and are supposed to be 
reviewed in their likeness to the Western societies. Especially so called ‘West-
ern merits’ like freedom and equality constitute to a great degree the western 
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“group charisma.” The author Dawud Gholamassad sees this historical back-
ground as a reason for Islamophobia in Western countries and calls these atti-
tudes a “neurotic Culture of superiority” (Gholamassad 2015). Paradoxically, 
the outsiders are more or less excluded from these merits.3 According to Elias 
and Scotson these dynamics of exclusion are inherent part of an established-
outsider-figuration (Elias and Scotson 1994).4  
Sarrazin has mixed his cultural thesis about Muslims with a biological thesis 
concerning their intelligence. He opposes that Muslims, additional to their 
“inferior culture,” are genetically less intelligent than the ethnically German 
population. He also suggested that, because immigrants have not proven to be 
as successful in school in Germany as the autochthonous part of the society, 
“the country is not only shrinking, but it is also becoming less intelligent” 
(Sarrazin 2010a, 85).  
The internal differences in performance [between Muslims and autochthons] 
result apparently broadly from innate differences in the ability to learn, there 
is no other possible reason, because these differences are stable although there 
are very diverse school-systems in the several German federal states (ibid., 
213, translated by the author). 
Because of the historical gilt of the National Socialist ideology which caused 
the Second World War, killing millions of people during the Holocaust, this 
kind of biological argumentation counts especially in Germany as very politi-
cally incorrect. If you use this kind of argumentation you will be perceived as a 
Nazi. In the Sarrazin debate I analysed, a lot of criticism against Sarrazin con-
centrates only on the biological argumentation of Sarrazin’s book, calling it 
racist, while his argumentation based on ‘culture’ gets explicitly or implicitly a 
lot of approval. Although in democratic societies stigmatisation gets covered in 
a “politically [HSR: politically] correct” language, however, the mechanism of 
exclusion and emotional defamation of the outsider-groups stay the same. 
There might be differences in the appearance in stigmatisation based on ‘race’ 
or ‘culture,’ but they share structural similarities. 
1.2  Sarrazin Debate, Types of Argumentation 
My Analysis of Sarrazin debate was based on two dimensions: 
- Criticism on eugenic, racist argumentation – Yes or No?  
                                                             
3  Some authors show that those allegedly ‘Western’ merits are not originally Western but 
came up in several societies and to different times (Çağlar 2002; Sen 2007). 
4  For example in Germany the guest workers earned much less than German workers, their 
housing became separated because of the inequality of wages. Because of the refusal of the 
status of citizenship until the late 1990ies, there were no options for them to participate in 
political processes, to vote or to contest a seat in parliament. There were also restrictions on 
the employment market, especially since the 1980s when unemployment became a major 
problem in Germany (Bade 1994). 
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- Criticism on cultural argumentation – Yes or No?  
From this pattern four types of argumentation surrendered: 
Type 1: (D1: Yes; D2 Yes) (37.8 %): Criticism on both: eugenic, racist, and 
cultural argumentation. 
Type 2: (D1 Yes; D2 No) (40.5 %): Criticism on eugenic, racist argumenta-
tion, approval to cultural argumentation. 
Type 3: (D1: No; D2 Yes) (0 %): Approval to eugenic, racist argumentation, 
criticism on cultural argumentation. 
Type 4: (D1: No; D2: No) (21.7 %): Approval to both: eugenic, racist, and 
cultural argumentation of Sarrazin. 
To illustrate the debate around Thilo Sarrazin some paradigmatic quotations 
for every Type of argumentation are presented here: 
Type 1: Andrian Kreye, a German author and journalist, recognizes the in-
dulgences of Sarrazin’s argumentation on both dimensions: “At the moment the 
debate concentrates on the three big weak points in Sarrazin’s text: the ethicis-
ing of a class problem, the eugenic consideration of an education problem and 
the segregated treatment of the problems of integration” (Kreye 2010, 75 et 
seq., translated by the author). This type of argumentation represents a critical 
view on Sarrazin’s argumentation. The pseudoscientific descriptions of Mus-
lims by Sarrazin are unmasked by Kreye and identified as covers of social 
inequalities.  
The lawyer Eberhard Schulz works at the ‘House of Democracy and Human 
Rights,’ in Berlin; he admits that:  
racism, at today’s state of science and international discourses is far from be-
ing only a biological founded racial fanaticism. Increasingly racial patterns of 
argumentation base on attributions like ‘cultures,’ ‘nations,’ ‘ethnicities’ or 
‘religious affiliation.’ Characteristic for racism is the construction of pretend-
ed homogenous groups, whose members negative Qualities are attributed 
(Schulz in ibid., 103, translated by the author). 
Schulz recognises the structural similarities between both types of stigmatisa-
tion. It is not the feature itself ‘race’ or ‘culture’ which makes stigmatisation 
possible, but the Believe that these features determine people and their norma-
tive valuation. 
Type 2: Henrik M. Broder is a famous and approved editor in Germany.  
He [Sarrazin] slips on the known banana peels of political correctness with 
vulnerable biologic shortages. But his findings referring to the failed integra-
tion of the Turkish and Arabic immigrants are beyond any doubt (Broder in 
ibid., 124, translated by the author).  
Broder represents the type of input in Sarrazin debate which criticises the eu-
genic argumentation as politically incorrect but to the cultural argumentation 
which is based on the same deterministic view as the eugenic one, he offers 
explicit agreement. Because of his own biographical experiences as a German 
Jew, Ralph Giordano disclaims a eugenic based argumentation of social ine-
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qualities. To Sarrazin’s descriptions about “Muslim parallel societies,” includ-
ing the claim that Muslims in Germany isolate themselves from the mainstream 
society, he agrees.  
There is no integration without the overcoming of the barriers that emerge out 
of the manners, customs, and traditions of the Muslim minority itself. […] 
Sarrazin’s book points the view to the historical background: on the fact that, 
two cultural circles with very different stages of development clash: the Ju-
daeo-Christian one, which stepped up enormously in the past 500 years with 
the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the civil revolution, and its perpetuation, 
while the other one, the Muslim circle stagnated during this period (Giordano 
in ibid., 95 et seq., translated by the author).  
Giordano captures Sarrazin’s perspective, that the inclusion of Muslims in 
German society is not possible because of the specific features of this minority. 
As one can see above, this is the type of argumentation which emerged the 
most during Sarrazin debate. The logic in these inputs seem to be – since it is 
very politically incorrect to use eugenic argumentation for the stigmatisation of 
groups – ‘culture’ is now a new base to label people in a distinctive way with-
out getting accused of being racist.  
Type 3: There was no input which agreed with the eugenic argumentation 
and at the same time criticised the cultural argumentation of Sarrazin. This 
hints to the fact that Sarrazin’s eugenic argumentation is perceived as more 
radical and inappropriate than the cultural argumentation. 
Type 4: Klaus von Dohnanyi is a prominent politician who used to be minis-
ter of economic affairs in Germany as well as mayor in the city of Hamburg. 
Dohnanyi is of the opinion that Sarrazin is not a racist. Sarrazin’s main argu-
ment would be:  
that Germany is in danger to melt down its elites because those have an insuf-
ficient amount of kids, while groups which haven’t been tracking attention for 
work and achievement are having a lot of kids therefore the level of perfor-
mance of the nation will descend. Sarrazin’s assertion that there are certain 
cultural attributes of ethnics groups, can’t be doubted by anyone with subject 
knowledge (Dohnany in ibid., 129, translated by the author).  
He requests to his readers: “Please no cowardice of concepts like race, Jew, 
Muslim: they exist” (ibid., 131, translated by the author). Klaus von Dohnanyi 
misconstrues the constructive character of categories like ‘race’ and ‘culture.’ 
Necla Kelek, a German sociologist, also agrees with both lines of argumenta-
tion in Sarrazin’s book:  
The connection between intelligence and demography revealed by Sarrazin is 
defamed as biologist. Withal the healthy human intellect seems to suggest, that 
ethnics like for example the peoples of Anatolia and Egypt, which over centuries 
were inhibited to learn to read and write by the Osman’s, where still today girls 
aren’t allowed to go to school, inherit different talents than the sons of Sebastian 
Bach and also that in concern of intelligence there is existing something like a 
Gaussian Distribution (Kelek in ibid., 33, translated by the author).  
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Kelek expresses explicit approval to both strands of argumentation. She en-
deavours the “healthy human intellect” for her argumentation instead of scien-
tific research and presents a closed negative picture of the Osman’s (group 
disgrace) and an admiring view on the picture of Germans “sons of Sebastian 
Bach” (group charisma). 
The frequent unquestioned use of cultural stigmatisation in the German de-
bate around Thilo Sarrazin, especially in well-educated milieus, brings up the 
idea that the German discourse about Muslims has been influenced by the 
theory of “Clash of Civilizations” which was established by Samuel P. Hun-
tington in 1993. My hypothesis is that the culture-clash paradigm has had a 
great influence on the picture of Muslim immigrants in Germany and made 
them outsiders, also among the immigrants themselves. Especially the fact that 
most of the inputs to the discussion criticised Sarrazin’s eugenic theses as stig-
matisation while at the same time his argumentation based on “culture” is giv-
ing a lot of approval gives a hint to the establishment of the culture-clash para-
digm, which seems to be regarded as realistic, scientifically correct, and 
therefore not stigmatising. The new manifestations of excluding and stigmatis-
ing people on the frame of reference ‘race’ or ‘culture,’ may differ in their form 
and appearance, but they share structural similarities. The core of this both 
ways of discrimination is the uneven distribution of power resources in an 
established-outsider figuration and their self-relevant experience by the mem-
bers of the established groups (Elias and Scotson, 1994). This strength of ar-
gumentation will be enlarged upon later in this paper. 
2.  The Clash of Civilizations – Culture-Clash Paradigm 
Where does this convincement that differences in culture are the decisive 
measure causes of conflicts come from? In Sarrazin’s line of argumentation 
there are obviously traces to the theory of “the Clash of Civilizations” by Sam-
uel P. Huntington, which he established in the 1990s and in summary implies 
“cultural identity” as the new paradigm worldwide. This paradigm particularly 
evolved in the absence of the Cold War ideologies and identified cultural dif-
ferences as the main cause of conflicts. 
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world 
will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions 
among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Na-
tion states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the prin-
cipal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of dif-
ferent civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. 
The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future (Hun-
tington 1993, 22). 
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2.1  Antagonism between West and Islam 
By defining the contrast between liberal, Christian, and democratic Western 
societies on the one side, and antiquated, fundamentalist Muslim societies on 
the other side, Huntington specially refers to this alleged “fundamental cultural 
difference” (Huntington 1997, 180). Also public discourses tend to pick up this 
line of arguments as it has shown in Sarrazin debate. Huntington emphasises a 
close cooperation between western countries against the alleged Islamic force:  
The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Is-
lam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of 
their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power (Huntington 
2002, 217).  
In the following, I will sum up Huntington’s main theses why the West and the 
Islam are likely to “clash”: The collapse of communism has led to the emer-
gence of new conflict potentials and power balances in the world. Huntington 
admits that an increasing Muslim population globally will lead to broad immi-
gration of Muslims into Western countries. Additionally he assumes a danger-
ous “Islamic resurgence,” which allegedly has given Muslims renewed confi-
dence and worth of their civilisation and values in comparison to Western 
societies. Here one can see great parallels to Sarrazin’s argumentation. At the 
same time the West tries furthermore to universalise its institutions and values 
which will give rise to the resistance of Muslims who are increasingly getting 
powerful. Huntington is convinced that increasing contact between Western 
and Muslim populations will stimulate the sense of their own identity and their 
differences on both sides (ibid., 211). 
Events such as the terror attack on the World Trade Centre on 09.11.2001, 
and the following interventions of the United States of America in Iraq und 
Afghanistan seem to give evidence to the paradigm of the “Clash of Civiliza-
tions.” Recent events like the terror attack on the office of the satire paper 
Charlie Hebdo by a fundamentalist Muslim confirm the continuity of this per-
ception. According to this perspective public and political debates tend to in-
terpret social, economic, and political inequalities and conflicts between groups 
as a result of differences in “culture” (Benz 2013; Bukow et al. 2007). 
2.2  Criticism of Huntington’s Argumentation 
Though in public still very popular, Huntington’s theses gathered a lot of criti-
cism in the scientific community.  
In particular, Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis (1993) has at-
tracted an enormous amount of attention, both for its simplicity in dividing the 
world into mutually exclusive communities characterized by deep-essential 
differences, and for his pessimistic conclusion that these differences are so 
fundamental as to make the communities in question more or less implacably 
opposed to one another.[…] But even Huntington’s sharpest academic critics 
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have failed to provide a coherent alternative to civilizational essentialism 
(Hall and Jackson 2007, 1). 
Edward Said criticises the essentialist terms that Huntington uses, camouflag-
ing the complexity of the worlds interdependencies. “Labels like ‘Islam’ and 
‘the West’ serve only to confuse us about a disorderly reality” (Said 2001). The 
authors Hall and Jackson criticise Huntington because of the “essential differ-
ences” and “implacable opposition” between civilisations which Huntington 
promotes (Hall and Jackson 2007, 1 et seq.). The dichotomous thinking of 
Huntington renders it impossible for him to perceive the figuration between 
first and third world; in his thinking they are essential contradictions which 
have nothing to do with each other (Çağlar 2002, 147). Çağlar recognises the 
heritage of the Cartesian episteme in Huntington’s perspective, which disre-
gards traditional elements in modern humans and modern elements in tradition-
al humans. He validates the clash of civilisations paradigm as scientifically 
inadequate (ibid., 139). 
“An abstract universalism is constructed to elevate a claim to power on this 
constructed matter” (ibid., 146 et seq., translated by the author). According to 
Çağlar, notions like ‘civilisation,’ ‘modernity’ and ‘West’ need to be proved in 
their ideological content instead of understanding them as neutral descriptions 
of the reality (ibid., 147), because: “insofar produces and reinforces the para-
digm of Civilizations trained schemes of thinking on the background of an 
established political symbolic of the euro-centric discourse” (ibid., translated 
by the author). 
Huntington handles ‘civilisation’ or ‘culture’ as reified and stationary enti-
ties and ignores their complex dynamics and interdependences as well as their 
potential of change and mixtures as human beings could change and integrate 
different contradictory identities in themselves. This kind of dichotomous writ-
ing interferes with recognising figurations between ‘West’ and ‘Islam.’ Hun-
tington also does normative estimation of Islam and naturalises the conflict 
between the ‘West’ and ‘Islam,’ when he talks of an “historical antagonism” 
(Huntington 2002, 212). ‘Culture,’ however, cannot be seen as a homogeneous 
entity which determinates the individual identity and capabilities. Huntington’s 
perspective prevents the identification of power structures and associated social 
emotional valuations which lead to the creation of self- and other-images of 
established and outsiders. Furthermore, Huntington’s argumentation must be 
understood as an ideological and extremely involved perspective of the estab-
lished part of the figuration slightly diminishing in aspects of their former 
power chances. 
The concept of an established-outsider figuration seems to draw a much 
more differentiated picture of this kind of group processes and opens the view 
to regularities and interdependencies of group conflicts. According to this 
concept there is a very close connection between ‘power’ and ‘self-esteem.’ 
Behind every kind of social inequality one could notice this underlying connec-
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tion. With an example of a German debate around Muslim immigration I 
demonstrated that this debate is being carried out in a more involved and heter-
onymous way than from a more distanced perspective as an established-
outsider figuration.  
Since a lot of European countries have a minority population of Muslims, 
some came as guest workers (especially in Germany), some from the past colo-
nies of France or Great Britain, others flew from their home countries because 
of political or ethnical pursuit, there are also similarities in the discourses about 
this group. This debate about “Muslim immigrants as a problem” is carried out 
in a lot of European countries (Cinalli and Giugni 2013). Huntington seemed to 
provide arguments which emerged to be useful to explain some problems 
which arouse out of the disproportionate low status of Muslim people in Euro-
pean societies. From Huntington’s perspective, the low social position of a lot 
of Muslim immigrants is perceived as consequence of their distinctive cultur-
al/religious identity. From a figurational perspective, following Norbert Elias 
one can see that Huntington has recognised some important fault lines of con-
flict in the world but that he has been misinterpreting difference in ‘culture’ as 
the origin for those conflicts. It is rather the other way around: the exclusion 
from all power resources could lead to ‘cultural,’ educational, and emotional 
differences (Elias and Scotson 1994, xxxii, xxix). As the experiences of inte-
gration’s processes of former outsider groups in some traditional emigration 
countries indicate this reality of a separated outsider-group could be changed in 
the course of processes of integration and inclusion by allowing the members 
of outsider groups to have a share of decisive power resources in the given 
society. Unfortunately Huntington’s lines of argumentation influenced public 
and political debates and contributed to a broad misinterpretation of the origins 
of increasing conflicts as ‘cultural.’ 
3.  Figurational Perspective 
From a figurational and process-sociological point of view, introduced by 
Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson, a totally different interpretation of conflicts 
between groups is possible. Important aspects of the theoretical framework are 
that the analysis of interdependencies and figurations of human beings are 
fundamental to understanding social life. In an established-outsider figuration 
there are always differences in the distribution of power and status resources. 
‘Having power’ is translated in this kind of figuration normally as being worth 
more. This connection is named by Elias and Scotson as “the logic of emo-
tions” (Elias and Scotson 1994, xxiii). Especially in the course of processes of 
democratisation, the members of established groups feel threatened by the 
members of outsiders groups as the ‘loss of power’ means according to this 
logic the ‘loss of worth’ in terms of human quality. This is, according to Elias 
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and Scotson, the reason why they try to stigmatise the former outsiders in an 
even more radical manner.  
With their studies on established and outsiders in a small town near Leices-
ter which they called Winston Parva, Elias and Scotson point out fundamental 
structures of group-processes and their dynamics in time. In this group-conflict, 
between the “old” community members and “new” inhabitants there were 
neither a cultural difference nor a difference of class or ethnicity between these 
groups but still a serious group conflict arose out of their living together. The 
old community members closed ranks against the newcomers even though they 
were from the same class and had the same ethnic or cultural background 
(ibid., xvii). This fact is in opposition to Huntington’s and Sarrazin’s assump-
tion that culturally closeness would evoke group cohesion automatically while 
cultural differences would cause conflict (vigil. 1.1; 2.1). 
It seems that terms like ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic,’ widely used in this context both in 
sociology and in society at large, are symptomatic of an ideological avoidance 
action. By using them, one singles out for attention what is peripheral to these 
relationships (e.g. differences of skin colour) and turns the eye away from 
what is central (e.g. differences in power ratio and the exclusion of a power-
inferior group from positions with a higher power potential) (Elias and 
Scotson 1994, xxx). 
The studies on Winston Parva brought Elias and Scotson to the hypothesis that 
there are universal dynamics of group conflicts which take place if one group 
has the chance to monopolise key positions in society and accordingly increase 
their gain of power in opposition to the other group, their self- and other-
images arise from their differences in power and follow certain patterns which 
are comparable in different societies. “One can observe again and again that 
members of groups which are, in terms of power, stronger than other interde-
pendent groups, think of themselves in human terms as better than the others” 
(ibid., xv). 
As steeper as the hierarchy of established and outsiders is developed in 
terms of power, as greater is the difference in the self-images between both 
groups: the feeling of superiority and pride on the side of the established and the 
feeling of inferiority and pudency on the side of the outsiders. In extension to 
what Marx said about the coherence of material source and power, Elias and 
Scotson admit that economic resources play an important role in group conflicts, 
especially when people are starving for food and are not able to fulfil their per-
sonal material needs on a very basic level. However, when those basic material 
needs are gratified for both groups, the emotional evaluation of people, their aim 
to belong to a powerful group, and their need for a charismatic picture of their 
own group gain more and more relevance (ibid., xxxii). The connection between 
personal merit and self-esteem and the power chances of a we-group they call 
“the logic of emotions” (ibid., xxiii). “Power superiority is equated with human 
merit, human merit with special grace of nature and gods” (ibid.). 
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This experienced superiority of the established group is sustained by strict 
group norms which the outsiders get excluded from. Out of their felt superiori-
ty and their actual power chances, the established group is in the position to 
establish a “group charisma” for their own group and a “group disgrace” for the 
outsider group which becomes the basis of their stigmatisation. Since the out-
sider group complementary feels its lack of power chances as a shortage of 
human merit, they tend to experience themselves as less valuable than the 
established (ibid., xxiv). Out of this situation of a lack of power chances and 
stigmatisation, it is presumable that emotional deficits could emerge among the 
members of an outsider group (ibid., xxix). When power balances change be-
tween both groups in favour of the outsiders, the former lack of intrinsic value 
by members of the outsider group could lead to a strong requirement for re-
venge on the established among them. From the established point of view the 
cohesion and conformity of their group is of paramount importance to the 
preservation of their power: “Greater cohesion, solidarity, uniformity of norms 
and self-discipline helped to maintain monopolization, and this in turn helped 
to reinforce these group characteristics” (ibid., 152). 
This is achieved by tabooing the contact with members of the outsider group 
as “anomic contagion” and is perceived with “praise-gossip” for the one’s 
acting norm conform and “blame-gossip” for the ones that break with the taboo 
and thereby endanger the grade of group cohesion (ibid., xvi et seq.). Another 
very effective tool to consolidate the group charisma of their own group and 
the group disgrace to the outsiders group is the “pars pro toto distortion” as 
observed by Elias and Scotson: 
One example of the structural regularities of established-outsider relationships 
may help readers to discover others for themselves as they go along. As the 
study of Winston Parva indicates, an established group tends to attribute to its 
outsider group as a whole the ‘bad’ characteristics of that group’s ‘worst’ sec-
tion – of its anomic minority. In contrast, the self-image of the established 
group tends to be modelled on its exemplary, most ‘nomic’ or norm-setting 
section, on the minority of its ‘best’ members (ibid., xix). 
This aspect of distortion, which can be observed in Sarrazin debate, as well as 
in Huntington’s prescriptions of the West and Islam, constitutes another im-
portant tool to sustain the power differences to the outsiders and support the 
feeling of superiority of the established and inferiority of the outsiders as an 
integral part of their identity and accordingly their self-esteem relationships. 
Sarrazin for example argues that the Muslim people in Germany are less intel-
ligent than the autochthones (Sarrazin 2010a, 85). 
Even though these tools can be very efficient for the established group to 
sustain their amount of power, the power balances can slightly shift in favour 
of the established group and lead to the situation that the outsiders on the one 
hand feel their gain of power but on the other hand do neither see a direct 
change in the distribution of key positions in society at the institutional level 
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nor a change in the image of their group or more acceptance from the estab-
lished. They become more and more impatient with their marginalised position 
and start to criticise the unequal chances to their group. The established in this 
situation insist even stronger on their superiority and their right to occupy key 
positions in society in favour of the outsiders. This is usually the point when 
the conflict between both groups heats up: the outsiders gain more power and 
out of this establish their own group charisma while the established face the 
realistic fear of loss of their privileges and power superiority and accompany-
ing that their self-image of predominance. According to that group charisma 
and group disgrace are usually complementary.  
The “logic of emotions” which Elias and Scotson admit might help to ex-
plain, why especially commoners and middle-class people seemed to fear the 
Muslim minority in Germany so much. Most Muslims in Germany are not in 
direct material competition with them, but they threaten the feelings of superiori-
ty of this part of the German society, this can be an explanation, no excuse, for 
their rigid defence against them. For Elias and Scotson, the task of their concept 
of an established-outsider-figuration is not to blame or to judge any group in-
volved in these figurations, they rather want to enlighten the dynamics and rea-
sons for such figurations to eventually prevent ongoing escalations between those 
groups (Elias and Scotson 1994, 155 et seq.). 
4.  Historical View on Muslims in Germany 
Why are Muslims over-represented in German underclass and under-
represented in elite positions? Following Elias and Scotson, a diachronic view 
on the balances of power between both groups can enlighten these kind of ques-
tions (Elias and Scotson 1994, xxxvi). The first bigger group of Muslims came in 
the 1960s and 1970s as guest workers mainly from Turkey some from Tunisia 
and Morocco to Germany. It began as a win-win situation for both sides of the 
figuration. Germany on the one hand needed a lot of industrial workers with a 
low claim of income, the guest workers on the other hand, even though they were 
paid much less than the German workers were able to earn a lot more than in 
their home countries. For the German workers, the arrival of the guest workers 
meant advancement in the social structure of Germany. They rose as a whole 
social class in social position (Treibel 2011, 56; 2015, 99 et seq.).5  
Politically, those guest workers were only regarded in terms of the employ-
ment market, but not in terms of political or cultural integration at all as both 
sides expected them to leave the country at the end of their contracts. Political 
measures even had dividing effects on autochthonous and Muslims in Germany. 
                                                             
5  The concept originally was invented by the Swiss sociologist Hoffmann-Nowotny, in 1973. 
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Since the German politicians expected all the guest workers to leave after a peri-
od of work, there were no language courses supplied for them and their children 
(Bade 1994, ch. 5) and because of that, language barriers remained a problem 
even in the second and third generation in this group (Bade 2013, 68). The broad 
differences in income also led to separated housing of guest workers and autoch-
thonous population and accordingly little personal contact between both groups 
(Treibel 2011, 100, 129 et seq.). Following Annette Treibel one could talk of a 
“general restriction of housing supply for foreigners” in Germany (ibid., 148).  
In the 1980s the situation on German employment market changed, as far as 
in other European countries a great amount of industrial factories crashed, this 
led to massive unemployment. In political and public debates the repatriation 
(Rückführung) of the guest workers got into focus of foreigner politics 
(Ausländerpolitik), as it was called. German politicians surpassed each other by 
claiming Germany was no immigration country, which indicated a symbolic 
defence against the newcomers. As a result of the pressure of the German gov-
ernment on the one hand and individual reasons on the other hand, around 11 
million Turkish guest workers left Germany in the 1980s. Only around 3-4 
million of them stayed without being able to gain position politically (Bade 
1994, 54). Since the situation on the employment market was so bad, the au-
tochthonous part of the society felt more and more in competition with the 
guest workers and racist resentments rose. Until the 1980s all foreigners 
(Ausländer) got stigmatised under this category, Italians and Greeks as well as 
Turkish or Tunisian guest workers.  
With the reunion of West and East Germany (Wiedervereinigung) accompa-
nied by the narrower connection of Germany to the European Union a status 
difference between European and non-European foreigners in Germany was 
introduced. This among other things had repercussions on the identical dimen-
sion of the non-European migrants as well as in terms of their political partici-
pation and the access to employment market (ibid., 72 et seq.). For example 
foreigners from EU countries were able to participate in regional elections 
while non-European foreigners could not (ibid., 73 et seq.). These restrictions 
affected Turkish, Tunisian, and Moroccan people already living in Germany for 
two or three generations as well as Iranian, Balkan refugees who in great num-
bers moved to Germany in the 1990s. Great parts of these people had Muslim 
religion. All these developments described, especially the converse with Mus-
lim people as outsiders structurally and identically embossed the low status of 
Muslim population in Germany.  
This made a lot of Muslim people also structurally to outsiders under the 
immigrants in Germany. Especially in opposition to the immigration group of 
Spätaussiedler from the former UdSSR – who prevailed as ‘ethnical German’ 
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(Abstammungsprinzip)6 and had the possibility to achieve the status of citizen-
ship (ibid., 73). Sarrazin compares Muslim immigrants and Spätaussiedler in 
terms of socio-structural distribution and concludes the greater amount of 
Spätaussiedler in higher social positions as a proof that the cultural closeness 
would be the reason for the greater integration of them (Sarrazin 2010c). The 
jus sanguinis principle in German jurisdiction denoted an important aspect of 
structural discrimination to the group of Muslim immigrants (Bade 1994, 55) as 
well as the fact that non-Europeans were mostly excluded from status of citi-
zenship until the year 2000. Also the world-wide debate around Islamic terror-
ism and ‘the axis of evil’ affected the picture of Muslims in Germany in a 
negative way (Benz 2013, 8). 
While the idea of fundamental cultural differences à la Huntington em-
bossed public debates and the situation of Muslims in terms of social structure 
was low, these ideas seemed to give a lot of evidence to a lot of people in the 
debate around Sarrazin. Sarrazin, as well as to a minority of the German Mus-
lims who also insist on their cultural differences to the other Germans and 
introduced a counter group charisma which praises only Islam as the right way 
to live. From a process-sociological point of view one can see that the power 
ratios of the groups started off very different, especially in terms of political 
participation education and access to employment market, both bonds to the 
status of citizenship. The differences in power-ratio prevented a great amount of 
the group of Muslim to gain higher position in society. Besides, the symbolic 
defence, the claim ‘Germany is no immigration country’ and later the claim 
‘Islam does not match a Western way of living’ excluded immigrants who ap-
peared ethnical differently to the autochthonous from a German identity.  
At the same time the discontent and frustration within German Muslim pop-
ulation in terms of their low status and chances on employment market arose. 
Since they were always addressed as foreigners, somehow ‘different’ and ex-
cluded from a positive connoted German identity, parts of the Muslim popula-
tion themselves turned their backs on German society. Differences in chances 
and the power ratio between ethnic groups though never got into focus of the 
discussion. Since the paradigm of the ‘Clash of Civilization’ became en vogue, 
other possible reasons for group conflicts were overlooked. Especially as a 
little group of Muslims also applied to an alleged fundamental difference in 
culture to other Germans, the culture-clash-paradigm achieved even more evi-
dence in social comprehension. In terms of Elias and Scotson, they created 
their own group charisma and adopted reciprocally the thesis that culture 
makes them different in a deterministic way. This little group embosses again 
the picture the established have from the outsiders (Pars pro toto) even though 
most Muslim-Germans speak German as their mother language, feel German in 
                                                             
6  It means ‘right of the blood’ principle. 
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terms of identity, and gain more and more position in terms of education and 
integration in employment market. Germany Does Away with Itself was a valve 
for the harassment, that so many immigrants already belong to Germany and 
identify themselves with this country” (Treibel 2015, 157). 
This shows that the power ratio of Muslims in Germany rose, and still rises, 
and also gives a hint to the fact that conflicts between established and outsiders 
increase when the power balance shifts in favour of the outsiders. As Annette 
Treibel makes clear in her new book, Integrate yourselves, in a democratic 
country, the established have to become aware of their privileges and prepared 
to cede them if they take democracy seriously (Treibel 2015).  
It has shown that the established-outsider figuration evolved out of the ini-
tial situation of Unterschichtung and out of the institutional discrimination of 
Muslim immigrants in proportion to autochthonous population and other Im-
migrants groups in Germany. The cultural view on social inequalities also 
excluded them from a positive German identity and advantaged re-ethnic iden-
tification processes in some parts of this group – who think of themselves as 
culturally different and superior in terms of human merit in comparison with 
the established.  
The important question would remain: how can sociological research help 
to reinterpret those kinds of group conflicts and prevent misinterpretations 
like the culture-clash-paradigm which heads up conflicts and complicates 
intercultural communication? Because if every cultural group believes in their 
fundamental distinctiveness from other cultural groups dialog and approach to 
each other do not seem to be worthwhile and make confronting processions 
seem unavoidable.  
5.  Culturalism of Exclusion – Outlook  
Sarrazin’s and Huntington’s way of understanding and explaining group-
conflicts can be identified as a more or less unconscious strategy of the estab-
lished part of the figuration to protect their privileged social positions in relation 
to the outsiders. Following Elias and Scotson their publications can be identified 
as parts of German respectively Western group charisma. It is an expression of 
their sensed superiority, which is achieved by monopolisation of an important 
power and status position.7 But the established mostly do not recognise the con-
nection of power ratio and group charisma, self-esteem (individually), and be-
lieve in a “natural” superiority of themselves and their group members, compared 
to the outsiders. The belief in fundamental cultural-differences denotes a misin-
                                                             
7  Vigil “Logic of the emotions” (Elias and Scotson 1994, xxiii). 
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terpretation of the real dynamic of group-processes which promotes a more 
involved view on group-conflicts and can lead to more violent conflicts.  
It is necessary to establish a more distanced view on group conflicts and an-
alyse them in synchronic and diachronic ways, to identify the power structures 
which are profound of these conflicts. This perspective represents the great 
explanatory power of the concept of an established-outsiders figuration. This 
concept can explain why there are so many structural similarities in the devel-
opment beyond the form of appearance how these groups are involved with 
each other. It is existentially to understand that also in so called democratic 
countries there are still unequal chances for different groups to gain social 
position. Relying on Elias, Dawud Gholamasad embossed to rather talk of 
democratisation (which has not come to an end when democratic institutions 
are established) as a process of adjustment to power-equality of all groups in 
the society. “Ordinarily the functional, institutional and social-habitual dimen-
sions of democratisation are reduced to the state of the institutional aspects” 
(Gholamassad 2015, translated by the author).  
Accordingly processes of democratisation take place in several dimensions: 
functionally, institutionally, and symbolic-habitually. From his experiences, 
democracy often gets reduced to its institutional aspects. He interprets Islam-
ism as well as Islamophobia as de-civilisation aspects of democratisation 
(ibid.). Whereby the term civilisation means something different than civilisa-
tion concept of Huntington:  
The proportion of self-regulation and self-control in relation to all humans at 
in almost all situations increases. In coherence with the gaining of independ-
ence of the individual self-regulation entities, the range of the possibility of 
identification of a human being with other human beings increases relatively 
independent from their group affiliation. A de-civilisation thrust means ac-
cording to that a change in the different direction, the reduction of empathy 
(ibid., translated by the author). 
The term ‘democratisation’ seems to be more adequate and realistic than only 
talking of democracy, as it hints to the fact that also a democratic regime and 
institutions, does not mean that everyone is equal in terms of power resources. 
Earlier phases of democratisation in Germany concerned for example the power 
ratios between younger and elder generations in the 1968 movement and between 
men and women during the stages of feminist movements.  
For a differentiated analysis we have to take perspective on both sides of the 
figuration: On the one hand the hubris of the established of being better people 
than the outsiders while at the same time fearing the loss of social position 
because of the outsiders. On the other hand the humiliated outsiders who either 
accept a low self-esteem, which results from their low position and status in 
society and the stigmatisation through the established, or they create their own 
group charisma which can be radically different from the established one and 
gives them the possibility of a positive identity but also exclude them from the 
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mainstream society. Since a positive self-esteem is a crucial part of the identity 
of human beings, especially if their self-experience of being a marginalised and 
disenfranchised outsider changes in the course of processes of “habitual de-
mocratisation” (Alikhani 2014) it is presumable that some of the outsiders 
adopt an Ideology which is radically different from the Ideology of the estab-
lished. In terms of some Muslims in European countries a radical form of Islam 
can provide this kind of Ideology.  
The delimitation of the outsiders in terms of their power chances could 
again lead to more conflicts and gives the conviction of the fundamental and 
deterministic differences between established and outsiders even more evi-
dence. According to the “double-bind-concept” (Elias 1983, 173) of Elias, a 
more distanced perspective on group-conflicts is necessary to reduce the fear 
groups conceive towards other groups and to prevent escalation between them. 
In such situations, according to Elias, the members of the more powerful group 
is more able to detach themselves from this vicious circle and develop more 
reality-congruent strategies to overcome this destructive dynamic (ibid., 126 et 
seq.). Concluding one could say that the concept of an established-outsider 
figuration can help to understand the real reasons and dynamics of group con-
flicts and debilitate the evidence of the culture-clash paradigm. It is important 
to promote the reasons for established and outsider relations and strengthen the 
public awareness on such destructive emotional processes. This could help both 
groups to understand each other in a better way and may contribute to a de-
escalation of the double-bind situation between Autochthones and Moslems as 
established and outsiders in Germany. 
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